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Abstract
In some online labor markets, workers are paid by the task, choose what tasks to work on, and
have little or no interaction with their (usually anonymous) buyer/employer. Thesemarkets look like
true spot markets for tasks rather than markets for employment. Despite appearances, we find via a
field experiment that workers act more like parties to an employment contract: workers quickly form
wage reference points and react negatively to proposed wage cuts by quitting. However, they can be
mollified with “reasonable” justifications for why wages are being cut, highlighting the importance of
fairness considerations in their decision making. We find some evidence that “unreasonable” justifi-
cations for wage cuts reduce subsequent work quality. We also find that not explicitly presenting the
worker with a decision about continuing to work eliminates “quits,” with no apparent reduction in
work quality. One interpretation for this finding is that workers have a strong expectation that they
are party to a quasi-employment relationship where terms are not changed, and the default behavior
is to continue working.
Keywords: Economics of IS; Electronic Commerce; Field Experiments; IT and new organizational
forms
1 Introduction
According to Coase (1937), the boundary of the firm is determined by the relative costs and benefits
of organizing production through markets or through authority. For the labor input to production, this
markets-versus-authority choicewas conceptualized by Simon (1951) as the choice betweenwhat Simon
called a “sales contract” and the conventional employment contract. In Simon’s model, the employee
accepts a wage in exchange for giving the employer control over what precise task, from some set of
tasks, is done in the future. While employment is at will, the expectation is that the relationship will be
ongoing and persist until explicitly dissolved. In contrast, a sales contract is narrower in scope, with the
worker agreeing to complete a specific task for a specific price. When the task is completed and payment
made, the contract is dissolved. Simon’s labels are not always easy to apply (e.g., consider the salesperson
who works on commission), but the number of edge cases seems to have grown dramatically in recent
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years with the emergence of new labor-intermediating platforms. Platforms differ, but a number seem
to create quasi-employment or quasi-sales contracts that share features of both types of relationships.1
One kind of new labor-intermediating platform of particular interest is the online labormarket (Hor-
ton, 2010). In the case of online labor markets, some create relationships that at least have some of the
properties of traditional employment relationships: workers are paid by the hour, and projects can be
substantial and may require a number of different tasks, with the work being closely monitored by the
hiring firm. Examples from this mold include oDesk/Elance (now Upwork), Freelancer.com, Guru, and
several other more specialized sites. However, other online labor markets are far more task focused and
seemn to create sales contract relationships.
Themost extreme version of a task-focusedmarket is AmazonMechanical Turk (MTurk), where tasks
often take seconds and pay pennies. “Employers” in this market cannot exercise Simon-style authority,
because they do not communicate with workers (except initially, through the job description)—workers
simply and immediately complete the task at the terms proposed by the buyer. Workers are free to take
any task they want at the offered price. This market, at least based on its main characteristics, seems like
a true spot market for tasks. If this is the case, MTurk and markets like it would offer firms a profoundly
differentway of obtaining labor inputs. With a spotmarket, firms could buy discrete chunks of labor from
a global pool of workers at a market price, similar to how they obtain any other factor of production.
Even if MTurk is conceptualized by employers and Amazon itself as a spot market in tasks, this does
not imply that workers share this view or behave accordingly. In this paper, we test whether workers
on MTurk react as parties to a sales contract or an employment contract when presented with a wage
cut. We conducted an experiment in which we contracted with workers for a data-entry task, paid them
a high piece rate and then offered some treated workers the opportunity to keep working, albeit for a
lower rate. While in both the sales contract and employment characterizations fewer workers should be
willing to accept the lower offer, the two views differ in how “justifications” for the new offer should affect
worker uptake.
For a party to a sales contract in a spotmarket, how price changes are justified ismaterially irrelevant
1An example of a technology-driven platform creating this kind of confusion is Uber. Uber sets ride prices and determines
who is eligible to drive, but does not tell drivers which precise customer to pick up or when to work—but it does impose
standards of performance. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a number of worker classification lawsuits have sprung up around this
industry.
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and should not differentially affect uptake of the follow-on task. However, for a party to an employment
contract, a lower offer would be perceived as a wage cut, which in turn could provoke retaliation from
the worker, depending on the perceived justice of that offer. We designed the different framings and jus-
tifications so that they would provoke workers to view the cuts as either reasonable and fair or capricious
and unjust.2
Consistent with the employment view, but not the spot market view, we find that workers were more
likely to reject low offers, but justifications we deemed “reasonable” largely nullified this effect. Not
all justifications were effective—justifying the cut in terms of our profits actually increased quits (i.e.,
individuals unwilling to perform a follow-on task at the new offer).
A worker’s quality might suffer following a wage cut. We can only measure work quality for people
who actually accepted thewage cut andperformed an additional task. As such, it is possible that different
kinds of workers quit in different treatments, so differences in quality across treatments could simply
reflect selection effects as well as treatment effects. However, when we control for work quality from the
first stage, we do find evidence of lower quality in the “profits” treatments, suggesting the possibility of
retaliation.
In each of the different testing justifications for the new offer, we still explicitly framed the decision
about whether to continue working as a choice, with the new per-task payment made salient. However,
in one cell, we simply presented another data entry task with the new wage cut price clearly labeled,
but without an explicit framing of a new offer and the need for a worker decision. In this cell, 100% of
workers simply completed the next paragraph—a higher percentage than when they were offered their
previous wage. Worker mistake is a possibility—perhaps they believed that not completing our extra
paragraph would jeopardize payment—but we find no evidence of follow-on retaliation in this group.
A parsimonious explanation could be that workers regard themselves as being in quasi-employment
relationships and so the “default” is to simply keep working without the expectation of—or the need
for—renegotiation.
The evidence from the experiment suggests that even in the most “spot” of the online labor markets,
workers still bring an employee-like behavior to their interactions. MTurk is, of course, only one market
2Whilewe technically were offering a lower piece rate rather than a chance in time-based compensation, we refer throughout
to the text as a “wage cut.”
3
and the results of the experiment come froma self-selected sample of workers on thatmarket. It is neces-
sarily unclear whether these results would extend to othermarkets and other kinds of workers. However,
given thatMTurk is themost spot-market like in its observable characteristics, it seems probable that the
employee-like behavior found onMTurk would generalize to other online labor markets.
2 Conceptual Framework
Developments in information and communications technology have made it possible for firms to ob-
tain labor inputs from around the world. Given that labor markets have historically been strongly seg-
mented by geography, it is unsurprising that an enormous literature sprang up around IT offshoring
and outsourcing. This literature has focused on the decision to offshore and the sourcing mechanism
(Tanriverdi et al., 2007); the structure (Chen and Bharadwaj, 2009); formality (Tanriverdi et al., 2007) and
flexibility of contracts (Gopal and Koka, 2012); the interplay with the open source community (Ågerfalk
and Fitzgerald, 2008); and so on. In this work, labor may cross borders, but is still being mediated by
arm’s length contracts between firms. However, the emergence of online labor markets lets firms buy
labor inputs from workers directly, regardless of geography. These markets raise the question, however,
of whether firms are obtaining labor inputs as completed tasks, obtained in a spot market, or actually
creating micro-employment relationships?
How can we distinguish a spot market for tasks from a market for employment? In this paper, we
propose using the worker response to a proposed price change, i.e., a wage cut, as our distinguishing
test. Our proposition is that if workers respond to wage cuts in an employee-like way, then we have evi-
dence against the spot-market characterization. Of course, wemust define what “employee-like”means.
Our claim is that a party to a sales contract will respond to a proposed price change “economically,”
considering only the amount proposed. In contrast, a party that views himself or herself as party to an
employment contract will consider the fairness of the offer, and this fairness judgment will take into ac-
count context. To the extent that we, as experimenters, can alter acceptance of thewage cuts by changing
the context of the wage cuts, themore evidence we have in favor of the employment contract conception
of how the workers view what they are doing.
A distinguishing feature of employment contracts is that prices generally do not fall when demand
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falls (as in a recession). This fact has profound policy implications, as without falling wages, labor mar-
kets do not clear, and some workers are involuntarily unemployed. The most prominent explanation
for why firms do not cut wages is that workers with employment contracts—unlike, say, vendors with
sales contracts—care a great deal about the fairness of wages and any proposed wage changes (Bewley,
1999). As such, firms worry that wage cuts could be perceived as unfair and workers would retaliate ex-
plicitly, such as by sabotaging the firm, or implicitly, by withholding their cooperation and “consummate
performance.” What is considered “unfair” often seems to depend strongly on what occurred in the re-
lationship before the cut: laboratory experiments support the proposition that past wage experiences
can create wage reference points (e.g., Fehr et al. (2006)). It is the the workers’ expected reaction to the
perceived unfairness of wage cuts that makes them relatively rare. When wages have been cut, workers
seem to respond as the theory would predict. 3
It is theoretically unclear why fairness considerations matter so muchmore in employment transac-
tions compared to other kinds of commercial transactions. One possibility is that employment and sales
contracts fundamentally differ in the expectations parties have about when a contract has ended. As a
thought experiment, suppose we bought a single widget from a vendor for $1. If we returned the second
day and were told that a widget was now $1.01 (and the price was clearly posted for everyone as such),
we may not like the change, but it would be difficult to argue the change was unfair or exploitative. If,
in contrast, if we agreed to a price of $1 but when we were rung up, we were told the price had risen to
$1.01, we would likely be rightfully angry at the unfairness of the new “offer.” The key difference is that
in the first scenario, after the initial widget was bought, the original contract was over and both parties
would expect an additional transaction to require a new contract. In the second scenario, the contract
was not yet completed, and so the new offer was an illegitimate, exploitative attempt to renegotiate.
3In a real effort field experiment Kube et al. (forthcoming), cut wages, or more accurately, frustrated wage expectations, by
advertising the job using ambiguous language and then exploiting this ambiguity to pay someworkers (college undergraduates)
less than they expected, causing substantial outputs in reduction. Although field experiments offer a more compelling test of
gift exchange than the laboratory experiments, observational data from real, long-term employment scenarios would be more
convincing, but the circumstances needed for causal inference—idiosyncratic factors leading to wage changes for one group of
workers but not for another—are rare. Occasionally, this kind of scenario occurs, and the evidence from them is consistent with
the view that negative reciprocity can be (but is not necessarily) long lasting and harmful to the organization. Mas (2006) found
that New Jersey police forces losing arbitration closed fewer cases for several months after the decision; Lee and Rupp (2007)
found that airline pilots subject to large, industry-wide wage cuts were late more often. In the airline example, the effects were
modest and transitory, perhaps because many airlines were at or near bankruptcy when the cuts were made, thus muting any
fairness judgments.
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To bring us back to the labor context, an employer proposing a lower wage for the same set of tasks
is trying to renegotiate the contract: the employment contract already specifies the payment if the em-
ployer wants more of some task performed—namely the price they already agreed upon. In the Simon
view, this ceding of discretion over tasks in exchange for a fixed wage is the essence of employment. In
contrast, a buyer with a sales contract proposing a lower price for an additional unit of task is not trying
to renegotiate—once the task was completed, the original contract was completed.4
Even this conceptualization of fairness as being about contract completeness or agreed-upon con-
clusion is not quite right: it not viewed as unfair for workers (the sellers in a labor market) to propose
a new, higher wage. It is however, generally viewed as unfair for the employer to propose a new, lower
wage. In contrast, it is not considered unfair in other kinds of markets for buyers to propose a new, lower
price—this happens regularly in markets where bargaining is common place (and where buyers try to
obtain a lower price or a lower price for purchasing additional units of some good). The one exception
to the “lower prices in markets for employment are unfair” is that context can alter these judgements.
Fairness has made a somewhat slow entry into economics, with purported general theories of fair-
ness not appearing until the 1990s, with fairness being somewhat narrowly defined as preferences over
the allocations received by others (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993). A
central theme of this work is that individuals dislike inequality. As it is, those extant theories and the
empirical underpinnings are still rather controversial (Binmore and Shaked, 2010). However, empiri-
cal work has emphasized that preferences are more complex, with individuals showing a taste for social
welfare (maximizing total payoffs that are received even if allocations are unequal) and for justice (i.e.,
punishing people who act selfishly) (Charness and Rabin, 2002).
That preferences are more complex than some simple rule such as disliking inequality should not be
too surprising: the identification of fairness-related “anomalies” has an older history even in economics.
For example, Kahneman et al. (1986), who surveyed people on their beliefs about a variety of economic
factors, found particularly strong opinions about labor market matters: Kahneman et al. found that
people (a) view wage cuts that keep the firm solvent differently from cuts that increase already positive
4This employment versus sales contract distinction is similar to the fundamental distinction Bajari and Tadelis (2001) draw
between fixed-price and cost-plus procurement contracts, with the former analogous to the sales contract and the cost-plus
contract analogous to the employment contract.
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profits or exploit market changes and (b) see wage reference points as attached to specific workers in
specific jobs and not transferable to new employees or as having any relevance after sufficiently large
reorganizations.
The special importance of fairness in labor markets was emphasized by Rees (1993), who offers a
number of examples of “real life” wage setting where fairness considerations were paramount. A com-
mon theme in all of the examples from Rees and from Kahneman et al. is the importance placed on
context. The research on organizational justice, also highlights the importance of context. Colquitt et
al. (2001), in a summarization of 25 years of research on organizational justice trace the early theories of
what is “fair” (for example, a ratio of inputs to outputs in social exchange theory) to elaborations that put
emphasis on the importance of the procedure by which allocations are determined, the equality of those
allocations, and perceived need of the various parties. Many of these additional considerations are not
simply about which allocations a process generates, but rather the process itself, and additional factors
such as the situation of the various parties.
To illustrate the importance of context, to paraphrase slightly an example from Rees (1993), an office
worker learning he got a $2/hour raise would be quite pleased, but hewould be considerably less pleased
if he learned every other worker in the office got a $3/hour raise (or even a $2.01 raise). Similarly, proce-
dural justice matters—if the same office worker learns that raises were based on strict seniority and he
happened to be the most junior worker, he might view the situation very differently than if he learned
that the bigger raises went to the college friends of the HR director. In short, context matters, though
as far as we are aware, there has been no unified theory that can map all of these different contexts to
different popularly held fairness judgements.
Context can be manipulated, either by design or by chance, but the only study we are aware of that
exploits variation in context is Greenberg (1990), who looked at employee theft in two factories follow-
ing a temporary 15% pay cut. Employee theft rose in both plants, but in the plant where the CEO spent
over an hour explaining the cuts and fielding questions, theft rose less than in the plant where manage-
ment provided only a cursory explanation. The two plants were randomly assigned to treatment by the
experimenter, though arguably the sample size was just two plants.
In our study, if context can reduce or exacerbate quits byworkers, then the implication is thatworkers
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are behaving like employees. For our purposes, we do have some guides regarding different contexts to
try creating for our wage cuts (such as Kahneman et al. (1986)), but we are far away from having a tight
connection between a theory of human fairness judgments and what contextual manipulations to “try.”
We cut wages under different experimentally induced contexts and thenmeasured whether workers quit
and refused to work at the new lower rate or accepted the new rate and performed one more unit of the
task for lower payment. If workers accepted the wage cut, we could observe the quality of their work
on the subsequent task.5 Based on how workers react to those cuts, we can infer whether they perceive
themselves as party to a sales contract—in which there is no expectation of continuation, contracts are
complete, and only offered wages matter—or party to an employment contract with reference points
about wages, an expectation to continue working at the “old” wage, and concern with the fairness of any
offer.
It is ambiguous ex ante whether these fairness-mediated reactions would be more or less important
online. In our experimental setting, the short duration, anonymity, and “one shot” nature of interactions
could encourage the sales contract view. As interactions are one shot, workers have less fear of being seen
as an easy mark, as they might in a repeated interaction. Further, the limited time frame makes the for-
mation of reference points presumably more difficult. The very low-stakes cut has an ambiguous effect:
on one hand, the wage cuts are absolutely small and thus perhaps less offensive, yet the small stakes
make principled refusals less costly. In conventional jobs, quitting has far greater consequences, and
we would expect workers to be less sanguine about losing their jobs, even after a wage cut. The higher
stakes and longer duration of real jobs would probably make any fairness judgment more strongly felt.
These more salient fairness judgments might magnify the response to wage cuts, though perhaps reac-
tions with direct income consequences for the worker (such as quitting) are less likely and withdrawal of
cooperation is more likely.
5We are not the first researchers to reduce wages experimentally—in two psychology studies from the early 1970s, one by
Pritchard et al. (1972) and one by Valenzi and Andrews (1971), experimenters hired workers and randomly manipulated their
wages or their perception of under- or over-payment. Andrews and Valenzi found that wage cuts, which the subjects knew
were randomly determined, caused quits, but did not affect productivity. Pritchard et al. found that switching people between
a wage and a quasi-piece-rate lowered productivity when a subject’s past experience with the payment system led them to
believe they were underpaid in the new system. Our study differs in that workers did not know wage cuts were random nor did
workers switch between wages and piece-rates.
8
2.1 Why should we care about online labormarkets?
To date, there has been relatively little work examining the nature of online labor markets. Most studies
have focused on using them as a testing domain for some question of broader interest, such as Pallais
(2014) and Pallais and Sands (2013). However, exceptions include Horton (2010); Kittur et al. (2013);
Horton (2011). These markets are relatively new, which could explain the lack of research, but another
factor is that they have not received much mainstream attention. Historically, total labor income in the
United States has been about two thirds of GDP, or on the order of $8 trillion. By this standard, online
labor markets are minuscule. Furthermore, MTurk is not the largest of online markets (see Ipeirotis
(2010) for statistics onMTurk; see Agrawal et al. (2013) for statistics on oDesk (now Upwork)).
However, they are worthy of research attention for several reasons beyond just their current size and
the ease with which research can be conducted (see Horton et al. (2011) for an elaboration on this ar-
gument). First, they are labor markets that are so comparatively simple that they can potentially give us
insights into markets more generally: in the same way that studying gravity and classical mechanics is
easier without friction, studying markets without geography, social networks, strong institutions, and so
on, can be clarifying. Second, these markets are serving as a testing ground for novel combinations of
human intelligence and machine intelligence—particularly in the case of MTurk. The ability to obtain
labor inputs algorithmically as part of a larger system is something genuinely new in the world, and per-
haps unsurprisingly, some of the heaviest users of MTurk are academic computer scientists.6 It seems
plausible that this academic interest could eventually translate into widespread application and perhaps
fundamentally change how labor is supplied and demanded.
2.2 What is different about online work?
The most obvious distinguishing characteristic of online work is that it happens online rather than by
workers that are physically co-located. What is important about this is not likely to be the “online” face-
6To make this point more concretely, in the recent proceedings of the “Human Computation” workshop, which is part of
the AAAI (Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence) annual conference—the premier AI conference—use of
MTurk was dominant. Of the 25 papers from the 2014 session, 23 were empirical, of which 16 used a marketplace for workers
(as opposed to volunteers or users on social networking sites, for example). Of the 16 making using of online workers, all but 4
usedMechanical Turk—or 75%. Computer scientists are primarily building and testing new systems that take advantage of the
“labor as a service” aspect of these markets.
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to-face aspect per se; although a skype call or a Google hangout are not yet substitutes for face-to-face
interactions, as communications technology improves, the qualitative differences between physical co-
location and remote collaboration will presumably decline. What matters about online work is that it
removes the role of geography. Geography profoundly shapes labor markets, in that throughout history,
workers have needed to live relatively “close” to the productive capital and their fellow workers. This fact
had implications not only for what was made where and by whom, but also the human capital decisions
made by individuals and even the degree of specialization of workers. The differences in the returns to
different skills based solely on geography—and the arbitrage opportunity this creates—have been vividly
characterized as “trillion dollar bills on the sidewalk” Clemens (2011). In addition to these arbitrage op-
portunities, online labor markets change individual incentives to acquire skills. They might even allow
for more specialization as the extent of the market grows—in an online labor market, a worker can rea-
sonably specialize in some skill for which total global demandmight only be 40 hours per week.
There are other distinctive features of online work. In contrast to conventional markets, it is com-
monplace for workers to work for many different “employers” within a short amount of time, even in
markets like oDesk/Upwork that “look” more traditional. And as projects tend to be short lived, there is
far more individual variability in hours worked. The shorter duration of projects makes the search and
screening process both more important, as they must happen so much more frequently. At the same
time, the short duration of projects makes the stakes for any particular hire that much lower. The case
of MTurk—where there is no employer screening at all—is the exception that proves the rule, in that the
stakes are so low for any “hire” that the default is for any worker to work on a task without approval from
the employer. Unsurprisingly, all online labor markets have created features that try to make the search
andmatching process easier and faster: would-be firms can post jobs, get applicants, screen applicants,
and make a hire in a matter of hours.
In the case of MTurk, because workers search over the pool of tasks, employers need to attract work-
ers to their tasks if they hope to get them completed. Chilton et al. (2010) shows that employers delib-
erately add and remove their tasks from the marketplace at a high frequency so that their tasks appear
higher in the search results shown to workers. This stands in sharp contrast to the “normal” way that
firms get work done, which is simply to instruct their employees to perform the task. Firms competing
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to get workers to complete their tasks—rather than competing for employees—does suggest that online
labor markets can at least look like true labor spot markets.
3 Empirical context, conditions for causal inference and the real-effort task
employed
The experimental designwas quite simple, even if the particular details of each cell—and themotivations
for including that cell in the experiment—require more detailed explanation. We will first describe the
experiment in broad strokes and then introduce the details of cells when we present the results. The ex-
periment had three phases: (1) the wage expectation building phase, (2) the treatment phase, and (3) the
“games” phase. In phase (1), workers performed a real effort task at a high piece rate. Then, in (2), they
were assigned to different treatment groups and, in most cases, offered a new lower wage to perform an
additional unit of the task. This wage cut was justified in different ways across cells. If workers accepted
the offered wage, they performed one more unit of the task. Finally, in (3), all subjects played a series of
contextualized games designed to measure their attitudes towards us as their employer/trading partner.
The goal of this phase was to measure any change in worker “consummate performance” caused by the
various treatments (Hart and Moore, 2008). These games revealed little, and we confine the reporting of
game outcomes to Appendix A.
Before discussing the experimental design inmore depth, it is useful to explain the testing domain—
MTurk—and how the conditions for causal inference can be met in this domain. We will also describe
how we recruited subjects, the nature of the real-effort task and the games we used to try to measure
consummate performance.
3.1 Subject pool recruitment
We recruited experimental subjects fromMTurk, an online labor market. Through an interface provided
byMTurk, registered users perform tasks (posted by buyers) formoney. The tasks are generally simple for
humans to do, yet difficult for computers—common tasks are captioning photographs, extracting data
from scanned documents and transcribing audio clips. Buyers control the features and contract terms
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of the tasks they post: they choose the design, piece-rate, time allowed per task, how long each task will
be available, and howmany times they want a task completed.7
Workers, who are identified to buyers only by a unique string of letters and numbers, can inspect
tasks and the offered terms before deciding whether to complete them. Buyers can require workers to
have certain qualifications, but the default is that workers can “accept” a task immediately and begin
work. Once the workers submit their work, buyers can approve or reject their submission. If the buyer
approves, MTurk pays the worker with buyer-provided escrow funds; if the buyer rejects, the worker is
paid nothing.
Althoughmost buyers post tasks directly to MTurk, it is possible to host tasks on an external site that
workers reach by following a link. We used this external hosting method; we posted a single placeholder
task containing a description of thework and a link to follow if subjects wanted to participate. When they
completed all stages of the experiment on the external site, they received a completion code which they
entered into the original MTurk interface. Figure 4 shows the landing page that all subjects first arrived
at, regardless of assignment.
3.2 Real-effort task
For the real-effort task, subjects transcribed (not translated) paragraph-sized chunks of Adam Smith’s
The Wealth of Nations. A sample paragraph—and the interface subjects used to transcribe the paragraph—
is shown in Figure 5 in Appendix B. This task was sufficiently tedious that no one was likely to do it “for
fun,” and it was sufficiently simple that all market participants could do the task. The source text was
machine translated into Dutch and blurred, which increased the error rate of the transcriptions, thereby
providing a more informative measure of work quality. Translating the text also prevented subjects from
finding the text elsewhere on the Internet.8 Although this task might seem unusual and raise suspicions
that the workers were in some kind of experiment, we view this as unlikely. Transcribing text from im-
ages is a commonplace use of MTurk. In fact, it is one of the few tasks that Amazon now supports with
7Tasks are often done multiple times by different workers for quality-control purposes.
8Since the text was presented as images, subjects were unable to copy and paste the text into the text box on the form. It is
irrelevant whether or not any subjects actually knew Dutch since, if anything, knowledge of the language might make the task
more difficult given the poor quality of the translation. One subject that apparently did speak Dutch sent an email warning us
that the work was “grammatical gibberish.”
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pre-made templates and pools of vetted workers (though this was not the case when our experiment was
run). In Appendix B, Figure 12 shows the template and shows other, similar commonplace MTurk tasks.
3.3 Conditions for causal inference
To identify causal effects from the treatments, we needed ways to (a) as-good-as randomly assign sub-
jects to different groups, (b) keep subjects from changing groups once assigned, (c) keep subjects from
participating multiple times, and (d) minimize non-random attrition. These problems are somewhat
more challenging in an online setting; Horton et al. (2011) discusses these challenges and explains how
they canbe addressed, aswell as discussing themany advantages of using online populations—particularly
those in labor markets—as experimental subjects. Steelman et al. (2014) also highlights the usefulness
of sampling from non-traditional populations accessed online.
For (a): we sequentially assigned subjects to treatment groups as they accepted our task, stratifying
on arrival order. For example, arrival 1 went to the first cell, arrival 2 to the second cell, and so on, and
when all cells were exhausted, the next subject would go to the first cell again. Unbeknownst to subjects,
clicking on our link initiated the experimental group assignment. As subjects neither knew nor could
control their relative arrival order, this assignment mechanism meets the unconfounded assignment
condition necessary for estimating causal effects. In fact, this method provides more precise estimates
of causal effects. The reason for the improved precision is that stratification on arrival order improves
balance on arrival times, which in turn are correlated with demographics (because of time zones) and
behaviors (early arrivals aremore likely to be heavy users of the site). Ourmethod for achieving balanced
samples was effective: for the binary covariates of gender, resident in the U.S. or Canada, and whether
the worker spends more than 10 hours a week online doing tasks for money, none of the p-values for
a χ2 test are conventionally significant. The actual demographic survey used to collect these measures
is shown in Appendix B, Figure 11. Note that despite stratification, because of attrition during the pre-
randomization phase, the realized sample size for each experimental group differs by more than one.9
For (b): if workers were aware of the different treatment groups, they would have an incentive to
get into a group with a larger payoff. Even though subjects were unaware of the other treatments, to
9If we had no attrition, then stratification should lead to sample sizes differing by at most one by experimental group.
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prevent the possibility of subjects hunting for the “best” treatment group, the software assigning subjects
to groups tracked users’ IP addresses. This tracking prevented subjects from changing their assignments
after their initial “assignment” clicks.
For (c): workers with multiple online identities could in principle complete our task multiple times.
However, this double-dipping is unlikely; because buyers often want the same task done multiple times
by different workers, MTurk designed several policies and software features to prevent a worker from
having more than one account.10
For (d): to prevent differential attrition drivenby differences among treatments, all subjects had iden-
tical initial experiences during the wage expectation building phase. Subjects’ experiences differed by
group only after already performing three transcriptions. Because of this investment, there was no at-
trition after subjects observed their own treatment. An important point is that although we assigned
subjects to treatments at the moment they accepted the task, the conceptual point of randomization
was after the wage expectation stage, but before the treatment stage.
The pre-randomization attrition is easy to spot in the data: attriting subjects just stop working be-
fore the end of the paragraph, never get to the treatment stage, and never submit their completion code
to receive payment. We dropped from the sample any worker making more than 100 errors on a para-
graph. This occurred for a little less than 20% of all subjects who started the paragraphs, but since these
individuals were dropped prior to conceptual randomization, this kind of attrition is immaterial.
3.4 Measuring outcomes following the wage cut
We can easily measure whether a worker was willing to transcribe a fourth paragraph following a wage
cut. Measuring the quality of their work is somewhatmore challenging. Tomeasure work quality, we cal-
culated the minimum number of “edits” that would be required to transform the provided transcription
to a perfect transcription of the underlying text. For example, if the worker typed “infromation” instead
of “information,” we could fix the error with one one simple transposition edit, namely by switching the
“r” and the “o.” Note that this would be fewer edits than the two-edit adjustment of changing the “r” to
10Workers must agree to have only one account—any detected attempt to have multiple accounts leads to a permanent ban.
MTurk also requires browsers to accept cookies. If a person had two bank accounts or credit cards and two separate computers
not sharing a network connection, they could in principle participate twice, but given the low stakes and risks involved (if this
was detected, they would be banned from the site), we consider this possibility highly unlikely.
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an “o” and the “o” to an “r.” This minimum-number-of-edits metric is called the edit distance, or the
Levenshtein distance.
In addition to output and work quality, we also had subjects play a series of contextualized games
with us to measure their “consummate performance” on the task. The design of these games and the
results from the experiment are Appendix A.
4 Experiment design andmethodology
Figure 1 showshow subjects flowed through the experiment, from the expectation-building transcription
phase, to the treatment phase, and finally, the “games” phase. In the wage expectation building phase,
subjects transcribed three paragraphs at a rate of 10 cents per paragraph.11 If subjects finished three
paragraphs, they moved to the treatment phase. In the treatment phase, subject experiences differed
based on group assignment. Generally, subjects were offered some new piece rate to transcribe a fourth
paragraph. When a lowerwagewas proposed, it was always 3 cents—a 70% reduction from their previous
wage.
Subjects assigned to CONTROL (n = 23) were given the option to transcribe another paragraph at
their previous 10 cent piece rate. Figure 2 shows the interface used for CONTROL and lists the exact lan-
guage used for the groupwhere subjects were asked if theywanted to transcribe an additional paragraph.
Screenshots of all experimental interfaces and instructions are in Appendix B.
Subjects in WAGECUT (n = 17) were offered the option to transcribe another paragraph, but at a rate
of only 3 cents. In FAIRNESSPRIMEDWC (n = 24), subjects were first asked what they considered a fair
wage for the task, before receiving the 3 cent offer. Subjects in ONLYGAMES (n = 21) were not given the
option to transcribe an additional paragraph, but instead went straight to the games phase. We also
had three groups that were given the option to continue working at the lower rate of 3 cents, but the
offer was justified differently across groups. Justifications were based on: workers get faster over time,
PRODUCTIVITYWC (n = 25); our need (as employers) to pay as little as possible, PROFITWC (n = 23); and
11A paragraph takes about 100 seconds to enter, so the offered payment of 10 cents per paragraph is equivalent to $3.60/hour
($28.80 per day). It is challenging to assess wages on MTurk, as prices are for tasks, not for time, but evidence suggests that the
wage we paid is considerably higher than the median reservation wage on the platform. Horton and Chilton (2010) estimates
that reservation wages are approximately log normally distributed and centered at $1.38.
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Figure 1: Experimental design
WAGECUT: Will you transcribe an additional 
paragraph for 3 cents?
Worker agrees to perform 3 ¶ transcriptions at 10 cent per ¶
Sample paragraph is shown.
CONTROL: Will you transcribe an addition 
paragraph for 10 cents?
PRODUCTIVITYWC: “We find that workers do this 
task much faster after doing three paragraphs, 
would you be willing to do an additional 
paragraph for 3 cents?”
ONLYGAMES: (No 4th ¶ - Straight to Games)
PROFITWC: “We are trying to get this work 
done for as little money as possible, would you 
be willing to do an additional paragraph for 3 
cents?”
NEIGHBORWC: “We find that some workers are 
willing to a fourth paragraph for 3 cents. Would 
you be willing to do an additional paragraph for 
3 cents?”
UNFRAMEDWC: (Straight to 4th ¶)
FAIRNESSPRIMEDWC: Will you transcribe an 
additional paragraph for 3 cents?
Subject asked “What is a fair wage?”









Notes: This figure illustrates the flow of subjects through the experiment.
our observation that many other workers were willing to accept this wage cut, NEIGHBORWC (n = 25).
We also had an UNFRAMEDWC (n = 26) group, in which workers were simply brought to fourth para-
graph, without an explicit framing of a decision to keep or stop working, but with the fourth paragraph
clearly labeled as only paying 3 cents. Following the treatment phase, regardless of whether they ac-
cepted the wage cut, all workers continued on to the games phase.
Figure 2: Offer to perform an additional transcription presented to subjects in CONTROL
Notes: After subjects completed the initial three paragraphs, they were, in most cases, presented the offer to
do an additional page. This is a screenshot for offer presented to subjects assigned to CONTROL.
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5 Results
5.1 Accepting an unexplained wage cut
We first test whether being offered a lower wage caused fewer workers to accept our offer to transcribe
a fourth paragraph. At a lower offered piece rate, we expected fewer workers to accept the offer, since
for some fraction, the marginal cost of doing another transcription outweighs the marginal benefit. This
test cannot distinguish between the sales contract and employment views, but it does let us verify that
workers find the task costly and that precise amount offeredmatters to workers. The two relevant exper-
imental cells for this question are CONTROL and WAGECUT.
CONTROL: Subjects were offered their previous highwage of 10 cents to perform an additional transcrip-
tion.
WAGECUT: Subjects were offered a lower wage of 3 cents to perform an additional transcription. No
explanation was given for the lower wage offer. The precise language of the offer was “Will you
transcribe an additional paragraph for 3 cents?.”
Table 1 shows that, as expected, substantially fewer workers are willing to transcribe a pararaph when
the offered rate is 3 cents instead of 10 cents.
Column (1) of Table 1 reports an estimate of
ADDPARA=β0+β1WAGECUT+ǫ, (1)
where ADDPARA is an indicator for whether the worker performed the additional paragraph transcrip-
tion and WAGECUT is an indicator that the subject was assigned to that group (we will use this indica-
tor/group name convention throughout the paper). The comparison group in the regression is CON-
TROL. In terms of magnitude, we can see that a 70% reduction in wages (10 cents to 3 cents) led to an
approximately 30% reduction output, implying an elasticity of labor supply of about 0.42.
In Column (2), several pre-treatment subject characteristics are added to the regressionmodel. With
these added covariates, the treatment effect increases slightly relative to Column (1), but this estimate is
well within the 95% confidence interval for the Column (1) treatment effect, as wewould expect for a true
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Table 1: Effect of a wage cut on willingness of the worker to perform an additional task
Dependent variable:
Transcribe additional paragraph? (ADDPARA = 1)
(1) (2)










Comparison Group CONTROL CONTROL
Observations 40 40
R2 0.109 0.282
Notes: This table reports two OLS regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the subject
was willing to transcribe a fourth paragraph. In the control (the omitted group), CONTROL, the offer was 10 cents—
the same piece rate as for the previous work. For the treated group, WAGECUT, the offer was 3 cents. In Column (2)
regressors are added for several pre-treatment variables, including the indicators for whether the subject was from
the US or Canada, a self-reported male, and a continuous variable which is the log cumulative prior errors on the
three previous paragaraph transcriptions. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance indicators: p ≤ 0.10 :
∗, .p ≤ 0.05 :∗∗ and p ≤ .01 :∗∗∗.
experiment. There is some evidence that self-reported males were less likely to do the follow-on task, as
were those that made a large number of prior errors during the expectation building phase. However,
none of the coefficients are conventionally significant. We can test for whether there are heterogeneous
treatment effects by comparing the Column (2) regression model with one in which the treatment indi-
cator is interactedwith all of the pre-treatment covariates. Whenwe perform this test, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis that the coefficients on the interaction terms are all zero, (p = 0.414), making substantial
treatment effect heterogeneity unlikely, at least within the limits of the statistical power available.
5.2 Is offer rejection about fairness?
That fewer workers accept the offer to do an additional task is unsurprising—it is in a sense, over-
determined, as it is predicted by both the employment and sales contract views. However, we can par-
tially test whether workers have an “employment-like” view that a lower wage offer is a contract breach
by (1) getting subjects to think about fairness with respect to the task and then (b) presenting them the
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lowwage offer. Some subjects were assigned to a cell FAIRNESSPRIMEDWC, inwhich theywere first asked
what would be a fair rate for the task before receiving the 3 cent offer. Appendix B, Figure 6 shows the
interface used to present the “fairness” question to users.
FAIRNESSPRIMEDWC: Subjects were offered a lower wage of 3 cents to perform an additional task. No
explanation was provided, but we first asked subjects what they thought would be a fair wage for
doing an additional task.
For the sake of brevity, we simply describe the results rather than present them in regression tables.
Comparing acceptances in FAIRNESSPRIMEDWC to our WAGECUT cells, acceptance of the offer was 41%
in WAGECUT and 33% in FAIRNESSPRIMEDWC, or an 8 percentage point difference. Despite this lower
uptake when fairness was primed, the standard error for the differences in means is slightly more than
15 percentage points and the p-value of a t-test for a two-sidedmeans comparison is p = 0.63. Clearly we
cannot reject a null hypothesis of no effect from priming, but the direction of the effect is what we would
expect if worker decision making was mediated by fairness concerns (assuming a 3 cent offer after a 10
cent offer would be viewed by most as unfair).
5.3 The effects of justifying the wage cut
Providing some justification for a wage cut might change a worker’s probability of accepting that wage
cut. For example, a “reasonable” justification might induce the worker simply to consider the offer rela-
tive to their reservation wage for the task. In contrast, “unreasonable” justifications might even increase
the cost of accepting the lower offer. To return to the question of how we should characterize relation-
ships in this market, in the sales contract view, justifications should be immaterial, because they do not
change payoffs, but they wouldmatter in the employment view. To test this notion that justifications can
alter wage cut acceptance, we randomized subjects to cells with varying justifications.
PRODUCTIVITYWC: Subjects were offered a lower wage of 3 cents to perform an additional task, but
we first informed them that most workers can complete tasks more quickly after they gain some
experience. The precise language was “We find that workers do this task much faster after doing
three paragraphs, would you be willing to do an additional paragraph for 3 cents?”
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PROFITWC: Subjects were offered a lower wage of 3 cents to perform an additional task, but we first
informed them that we are trying to get as much work done for as little money as possible. The
precise language was “We are trying to get this work done for as little money as possible, would
you be willing to do an additional paragraph for 3 cents?”
NEIGHBORWC: Subjects were offered a lower wage of 3 cents to perform an additional task, but we in-
formed them that in our experience, other workers are willing to accept the lower offer.12 The
precise language was “We find that some workers are willing to do a fourth paragraph for 3 cents.
Would you be willing to do an additional paragraph for 3 cents?”
The motivations for PRODUCTIVITYWC and PROFITWC were to contrast “reasonable” and “unrea-
sonable” justifications for the wage cut. Although PROFITWC is unrealistic in the sense that no real firm
would propose a wage cut in that manner, it is still a useful treatment in that it lets us test how work-
ers react to an extreme, insulting justification: PROFITWC tests whether any justification—no matter
how insulting—“works.” Perhaps any justification would be effective—Langer et al. (1978) showed that
asking someone to let you cut in line to make copies “because you need to make copies” dramatically
increases compliance compared to just asking without the justification.
NEIGHBORWC tests the notion that workers “learn” how to react fromother workers. One reasonwhy
NEIGHBORWC might mitigate the behavioral response to a wage cut is that perhaps the psychic cost of
taking work below one’s past wage comes not just from a fear of being exploited, but also from a fear of
being singularly exploited. The notion that social comparisons could affect the response to wage cuts
has some empirical support—Luttmer (2005) found that individuals feel worse-off when others around
them earn more.
Consistent with the employment view but not the sale contract view, the empirical results in Table 2
show that justifications do matter, with “reasonable” justifications substantially increasing the fraction
of workers willing to work at the new, lower piece rate. Compared to the unexplained cut in WAGECUT,
however, the unreasonable explanation, PROFITWC, did not substantially decrease acceptance, at least
within the limits of available statistical power.
12This was a true statement. From earlier pilot experiments, we knew that some subjects were willing to work at this lower
wage.
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Neighbor justification, NEIGHBORWC 0.228
(0.152)
Productivity justification, PRODUCTIVITYWC 0.268∗
(0.152)
Profit justification, PROFITWC −0.107
(0.155)




Comparison Group WAGECUT WAGECUT + PROFITWC
Observations 90 90
R2 0.101 0.095
Notes: This table reports twoOLS regressionswhere the dependent variable is an indicator for whether theworker subject
was willing to transcribe a fourth paragraph. Comparisons are being made against WAGECUT, in which the offer was 3
cents and no justificationwas offered for the cut. In Column (1), indicators for each justification—productivity increases,
employer profits and comparison to “neighbor” choices are used as regressors. In Column (2), the “unreasonable” profit
justification is pooledwith the unexplained cut and the two “reasonable” justifications fromNEIGHBORWC and PRODUC-
TIVITYWC are pooled as an indicator for “Reasonable” justifications. Standard errors are robust. Significance indicators:
p ≤ 0.10 :∗, .p ≤ 0.05 :∗∗ and p ≤ .01 :∗∗∗.
We first consider how each justification by itself affected a worker’s willingness to perform the fourth
transcription at the new rate. Column (1) of Table 2 reports an estimate of
ADDPARA=β0+β1PRODUCTIVITYWC+β2PROFITWC+β3NEIGHBORWC+ǫ (2)
where the sample consists of all the justification groups and the unexplained group, with WAGECUT
being the comparison group. The coefficient on the productivity justification indicator is positive and
conventionally significant, with nearly a 30 percentage point increase in the fraction of workers accept-
ing the lower offer. The coefficient on the neighbor justification is smaller, with the effect being about
23 percentage points. It is not conventionally significant, though the difference between the neighbor
and the productivity coefficients would itself not be significant. The profit justification is negative and
non-trivial in magnitude—the effect is about an 11 percentage point reduction in task acceptance—but
it is far from conventionally significant. In Column (2), the outcome is the same, but we pooled what
we considered “reasonable” justifications, PRODUCTIVITYWC and NEIGHBORWC, and compared them
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to what we considered unreasonable or missing justifications, WAGECUT and PROFITWC. Here the dif-
ference is stark, with the reasonable justifications increasing output by nearly 30 percentage points. This
greater effect is attributable to the roughly similar magnitudes for the coefficients on NEIGHBORWC and
PRODUCTIVITYWC and the negative and fairly large coefficient on the profit justification indicator.
5.4 The effects of explicitly asking about task continuation
One of the key differences between the sales and employment contract is that in the employment con-
tract, the expectation is that the project will continue until explicitly dissolved. In contrast, the sales
contract is ended when the specified task is completed. We wanted to test whether simply presenting
workers the additional transcription task, labeled with the new 3-cent wage, would cause a different re-
action from workers, relative to flagging the proposed explicitly new wage and requiring workers to give
a yes or no answer to whether they wanted to continue. To test whether this offer framing mattered, we
created a cell UNFRAMEDWC.
UNFRAMEDWC: Subjects were not explicitly offered a lower wage to perform an additional task. Rather,
they were simply brought to the next task, which was clearly labeled with the new, lower wage of
3 cents. There was a button at the bottom of the screen that allowed them to quit and continue to
the follow-on contextualized games.
Consistent with the employment contract view, Table 3 shows that this “unframed”wage cut was remark-
ably effective, in that all subjects assigned to UNFRAMEDWC transcribed the fourth paragraph.
First we consider output in the unframed cell relative to the explicit, unjustified wage cut of WAGE-
CUT. Column (1) of Table 3 reports an estimate of
ADDPARA=β0+β1UNFRAMEDWC+ǫ. (3)
The comparison group is WAGECUT, the unexplained wage cut. The coefficient on the “unframed” indi-
cator shows that not explicitly framingwork continuation as a choice leads to very high acceptance of the
wage cut: in fact, 100% of subjects in UNFRAMEDWC performed the follow-on paragraph transcription,
compared to just a littlemore than 40% of subjects in WAGECUT. Column (2) reports the same regression
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Table 3: The effect of not explicitly framing the wage cut as a decision to continue working
Dependent variable:
Transcribe additional paragraph? (ADDPARA = 1)
(1) (2)




Comparison Group WAGECUT CONTROL
Observations 42 48
R2 0.460 0.155
Notes: This table reports OLS regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the
worker subject was willing to transcribe a fourth paragraph. In Column (1), the independent variable
is an indicator for assignment to UNFRAMEDWC, the unframed wage cut. The comparison group is
WAGECUT. In Column (2) the comparison group is instead CONTROL, in which subjects received a 10
cent offer to perform an additional transcription. Standard errors are robust. Significance indicators:
p ≤ 0.10 :∗, .p ≤ 0.05 :∗∗ and p ≤ .01 :∗∗∗.
as Column (1), but with the comparison group being the CONTROL group instead of WAGECUT. When
we compare the unframed wage cut group to the subjects that had no wage cut at all, we can see that the
unframed group had about a 25 percentage point increase over those not receiving a wage cut at all. In
other words, not framing a decision to continue working led to far more output than even offering the
previous rate.
There are several possible interpretations of these results. It is possible that subjects failed to con-
sider their option of refusing to do the task by simply entering a poor transcription (the most extreme
form being leaving the text box blank). Another possibility is a worker might believe they were in error:
if a worker thought she had read the instructions incorrectly, she might worry that a skipped transcrip-
tion would jeopardize payment for work already completed. Beyond just payment, workers might worry
about their reputation. MTurk does have a rudimentary reputation system, in that buyers can “reject” a
worker’s submission and future buyers can screen workers ex ante based on their rejection rates, making
rejections consequential. However, there is no rich reputation system with bilateral feedback and non-
binary rating options common in other electronic commerce sites (Dellarocas, 2006), including in other
online labor markets (Moreno and Terwiesch, 2014).
These caveats aside, the evidence does suggest that explicitly flagging a wage change has a differ-
ent effect than imposing the same change surreptitiously. If workers regard their relationships with the
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Notes: For each point estimate, we include the 95% CI, calculated using the Wilson method for a binary
proportion.
buyer as an employment contract, this continuation of work—without any explicit discussion of prices
or decisions—iswhat theywould expect to happennormally. In contrast, aworkerwith the sales contract
view who was told ex ante he would perform three paragraphs would be very surprised by an additional
task, as the contract was at that point dissolved.
5.5 Comparison of output by offer size, justification and explicitness of follow-on offer
The pattern of output results can be more clearly seen in Figure 3. We have divided reasons into “rea-
sonable” and “non-reasonable” with “reasonable” based on our own judgment. The plots show that rea-
sonable justifications keep output levels quite close to those in the 10-cent offer CONTROL group. The
remarkable uptake in UNFRAMEDWC is also apparent, as well as the much lower output in the cells with
no justification or an unreasonable justification.
5.6 Follow-on task performance
Workers might be willing to “accept” a wage cut and then retaliate by offering poor performance on
the task, such as by introducing many errors in the transcription. This is the consensus view for why
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firms are so averse to cutting wages. In our experimental setting, detecting retaliation is challenging
because of selection. We know that the different cells have different task acceptance rates. As such, any
differences in follow-on error rate could reflect some combination of selection and treatment. We can
potentially deal with this selection problem by controlling for transcription quality from the first phase
of the experiment. It is the case that error rates in the fourth paragraph are highly correlated with the
error rate in the initial three paragraphs: when pooled, the point estimate of the correlation coefficient
is ρ = 0.33 and a 95% confidence interval of [0.14,0.56].13
Table 4 shows that there is no evidence that workers willing to accept the wage cut were any worse
overall, relative to CONTROL. However, there is some evidence that workers assigned to the unreason-
able PROFITWC produced worse transcriptions, even when controlling for output quality during the first
phase of the experiment. However, it is important to remember that even with our prior error controls,
we cannot credibly estimate causal effects.
First, we test whether workers assigned any of the wage cut cells had worse performance compared





where EDITDIST4 is the edit distance for the fourth paragraph and ANYWAGECUT is an indicator that the
subject was assigned to any of the wage cuts groups. Note that we control for the log cumulative error
in the first three paragraphs, which should at least partially address the possibility that selection effects
drive differences in error rates. The coefficient on ANYWAGECUT is negative—implying fewer errors—
but is also imprecisely estimated and far from conventionally significant.
In Column (2), we decompose ANYWAGECUT into the indicators for the different cells and useWAGE-
CUT as the comparison group. This lets us test whether any of the framings or justifications amongwork-
ers accepting the wage cut affected output. Here we see that the coefficient on PROFITWC is large and
positively significant, with nearly a 50% higher error rate. This is suggestive evidence that workers in
the profits justification retaliated, but there are two important caveats. First, this group had the lowest
acceptance rate and so any selection effects would be particularly strong for this group. Second, we are
13Standard errors for the correlation coefficient were calculated with one million bootstrap replications.
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Table 4: Transcription errors in fourth paragraph among workers willing to accept the new offer
Dependent variable:


















Comparison Group CONTROL WAGECUT
Observations 96 79
R2 0.117 0.168
Notes: This table reports OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the log
edit distance for the fourth pargraph. In Column (1), the independent variable is
an indicator for assignment to any group where wages were cut. The comparison
group is CONTROL. In Column (2) the comparison group is instead WAGECUT and
regressors are indicators for the remaining cells in which wages were cut. Both
regressions include controls for worker error in the first phase of the experiment.
This prior error control is the log of the sum of edit distances for the first three
paragraphs transcribed. Standard errors are robust. Significance indicators: p ≤
0.10 :∗, .p ≤ 0.05 :∗∗ and p ≤ .01 :∗∗∗.
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looking at five different treatment cells and only one is conventionally significant. On the other hand,
for theory reasons, we also have reason to believe that if there was retaliation, it would be more likely in
PROFITWC.
6 Conclusion
Our main positive finding is that framing can strongly affect the behavioral response to a wage change.
Workers reduce output—andpossiblywork quality—whenwages are cut for capricious or selfish-seeming
reasons, butworkers do not reduce output asmuch and apparently are still willing to cooperate if the em-
ployer has seemingly valid reasons for his or her actions. Workers on MTurk exhibit the same fairness-
mediated reactions to wage cuts thought to characterize worker reactions to wage cuts in conventional
employment relationships. Further, the results from the “unframed” wage cut experiment suggest that
workers have a bias towards simply continuing to work rather than viewing the completion of the last
agreed-upon task as the end of the contract. While this is not the only interpretation, it is some evi-
dence towards the employment characterization of the relationships that are created (at least from the
worker’s perspective). As such, it seems unlikely that firms hiring in online labor markets can treat their
interactions as spot-market transactions, butmust instead consider the quasi-employment nature of the
relationships they seem to create.
An interesting question for future research is to what extent this employment-like characterization
makes an economic difference inwhat can and cannot be done inwhich kinds ofmarkets. The existence—
and to date, persistence—of very different kinds of platforms for online work seems to indicate that hav-
ing a variety of platforms is useful for different purposes, but each raises its own challenges. For ex-
ample, Boudreau et al. (2011), looking at paid programming contests, illustrates the power of the “open
call” format for certain kinds of problems, in that the probability of solution rises with more entrants,
and yet the contest version of a wage cut—addingmore competitors—can reduce incentives. They show
that for highly uncertain problems, the payoff to adding more competitors dominates, but not for more
well-specified projects. If sufficiently well specified and certain, the innovation “contest” of one—a sin-
gle hired worker might dominate. Going back to our MTurk domain, for certain kinds of problems,
an employee-like mindset is desirable, as the high-powered incentives in a sales contract can motivate
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workers towards both cost savings (good) but also corner-cutting and opportunism (bad).
Our results come fromMTurk, which is just one of several online labor markets.14 However, some of
the characteristics that MTurk exhibits in the extreme—very short-lasting relationships, relatively small
stakes, computer-mediated work relationships—are appearing in a variety of labor markets. In recent
years, we have seen the rise of new forms of computer-mediated marketplaces, including Uber, Lyft,
TaskRabbit, Handy, Instacart, and so on, that share some similarities.
These markets are are capturing so much attention because they raise so many questions. On the
positive side, the greater flexibility they offer workers seems valuable, expanding the set of options avail-
able to workers. It is an open research question as to how much value workers place on the flexibility
these kinds of markets afford them—the ability to work when they want, at terms that they set. On the
negative side, these markets have received criticism for potentially transferring power away from indi-
vidual workers and putting them more at the whim of the platform of would-be buyers. More research
on the nature of the relationships created in these platforms and the larger implications of online work
is needed.
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A Consummate performancemeasures
When we designed the experiment, we also wanted to look for other indications of work effort and co-
operation beyond just acceptance of the wage cut. To that end, we had subjects play a number of con-
textualized games to measure “consummate performance.” This part of the experiment had generally
uninteresting results—in part because of the relatively low power of the design to detect anything but
very large effects. We do present the results here in an appendix for the benefit of interested parties and
for completeness.
A.1 Consummate performanemeasures
To measure consummate performance, subjects played a collection of contextualized games that we
hoped would not seem unusual to the subjects. These games tried to measure worker patience, trust
in us, and cooperation with us. To measure patience, we simply asked subjects whether they would be
willing to forgo nearly immediate payment in exchange for a 30-cent bonus to be paid out in two weeks.
We measured trust with a modified version of the trust game (Glaeser et al., 2000). Subjects were
told to imagine they had $15 and that they could choose any fraction of that money to “send” to us. If
we judged their work favorably, we would double what they sent and “send it back”; in the event of an
unfavorable judgment, we would keep whatever they sent.15 The instructions and interface are shown
in Appendix B, Figure 7. To save money, we told subjects that we would select one player at random and
implement his or her choices. Although this game measures the worker’s trust in us (e.g., trust that we
will follow our own protocol and judge their work fairly), it is confounded with the worker’s confidence,
risk aversion and beliefs about our standards for the work. If these non-trust factors held constant across
experimental groups, we could in principle detect changes in trust, though this assumption of constant
effects is questionable. In any event, these factors should be unaffected by the treatment for the subjects
in a cell we created in which subjects proceeded immediately to the games.
We measured cooperation in two ways: (a) willingness to give free advice and (b) willingness to take
a short survey at a later date. For the first cooperation measure, subjects were asked to suggest ways to
make the transcription task easier. The wording of the request made it clear that offering advice was vol-
15The subject we randomly selected had chosen to send the full $15; we gave him or her $30.
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untary and that no payment would be made for the offered advice.16 The instructions and interface are
shown in Appendix B, Figure 10. For a second cooperationmeasure, we offered subjects the opportunity
to take a follow-on survey for an additional 15 cents.17
The instructions and interface for the survey request are shown in Appendix B, Figure 8.
A.2 Consummate performance results
In addition to simply not accepting a wage cut or doing a poor job, workers who face wage cuts could
withhold “consummate” performance. Consummate performance is difficult to measure—at least in
somemodels, the difficulty ofmeasuring (or at least contracting upon it) is definitional. These challenges
aside, we attempted to measure consummate performance with the “games” phase of the experiment,
which followed treatment. Each game was designed to give workers the chance to evince some changed
attitude towards us that a real employer might find consequential. The games are all described in Sec-
tion A. To aid in the comparison across groups, we created a cell in which subjects were not exposed to
an offer to perform an additional paragraph transcription.
ONLYGAMES: Subjects were not offered an additional task. After the initial transcriptions, they went
straight to the follow-on games.
We had hoped that our consummatemeasures would all be highly correlatedwith each other, suggesting
that the different measures were all manifestations of the same positive or negative change towards us
as an employer/trading partner. However, there is only weak evidence that this hope was borne out:
Table 5 shows the correlation matrix for the four consummate performance measures, pooled across
all experimental groups. We see that the patience measure had no strong relationship to any of the
other measures and is even slightly negatively correlated with the advice measure. The advice and trust
measures are positive related, as are survey and advice measures—but survey and trust are not related
to each other.
16The text of the actual question was, “Please help us make these tasks easier for other workers. Describe what steps workers
can take to make doing these transcriptions easier.”
17When you pay workers on MTurk, you can embed a short message about why you are paying them—we embedded the
link to our survey in this message. Remarkably, not one person who agreed to do the survey actually did it after we sent them
the link. We had intended to use completing the survey as another measure of cooperation and trustworthiness, but there
was no variation in survey response. Given the universal rejection, we fear that some technical problem may have prevented
completion.
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The first question about the any of the games is whether simply being asked to perform an additional
paragraph transcription had any effect. For this, we can compare CONTROL, which received a 10-cent
offer, to the ONLYGAMES group. Column (1), Table 6 reports an estimate of
SURVEY=β0+β1CONTROL+ǫ (5)
where the sample consists of subjects in CONTROL and the excluded group is ONLYGAMES. We can see
that subjects that were presented an additional fourth paragraph were about 9 percentage points less
likely to agree to a survey compared to those simply brought directly to the games. However, this estimate
is not conventionally significant. Note that among ONLYGAMES, agreement to do the survey was 100%.
For the other games, we also find no evidence of a differential performance: in two-sided t-tests for both
the advice z-score and the trust z-score, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in group
means, with p = 0.29 and p = 0.174, respectively. Furthermore, the CONTROL coefficient is positive for
the trust and advice measures.
Next we test whether any wage cut—regardless of how framed or justified—affected willingness to
take the survey. Column (2) reports an estimate of
SURVEY=β0+β1ANYWAGECUT+ǫ, (6)
where ANYWAGECUT is an indicator that the subject was assigned to WAGECUT of any of the four wage
cut groups. The comparison group is the CONTROL group, to which the 10 cent offer was made. The
coefficient on ANYCUT is very close to zero, implying no detectable effect on willingness to take the
survey. As before, for the other games, we also find no evidence of a differential performance: in two-
sided t-tests for both the advice z-score and the trust z-score, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no
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difference in groupmeans, with p = 0.26 and p = 0.67, respectively.
Table 6: The effects of wage cuts on consummate performance measures from the “games” phase of the
experiment
Dependent variable:
Agree to complete survey?, (SURVEY = 1) Advice Z-Score Trust Z-Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CONTROL −0.087
(0.063)
Any wage cut offer? −0.013
(0.067)
FAIRNESSPRIMEDWC −0.101 −0.420 −0.267
(0.092) (0.312) (0.311)
NEIGHBORWC −0.202∗∗ −0.302 0.038
(0.094) (0.317) (0.317)
PRODUCTIVITYWC 0.059 0.167 0.137
(0.092) (0.312) (0.311)
PROFITWC 0.020 −0.400 −0.076
(0.091) (0.309) (0.309)
UNFRAMEDWC −0.025 −0.473 −0.189
(0.093) (0.314) (0.314)
Constant 1.000∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 0.226 0.127
(0.046) (0.062) (0.071) (0.241) (0.240)
Comparison Group ONLYGAMES CONTROL WAGECUT WAGECUT WAGECUT
Observations 44 163 140 140 140
R2 0.043 0.0002 0.085 0.057 0.020
Notes: This table reports OLS regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the subject agreed to
complete a short survey in the future, in Columns (1) through (3) and a z-score measure of the workers’ offered advice,
in Column (4), and their trust in us as employers/trading partners, in Column (5). In Column (1), the comparison group
are those subjects assigned to ONLYGAMES, which were not offered the chance to do a fourth transcription. They are
compared against CONTROL, which was offered 10 cents. In Column (2), all cells where a wage cut was proposed (i.e.,
3 cents for a fourth paragraph) are compared to the CONTROL to see if the wage cut collectively lowered willingness to
take the survey. Finally, in Column (3), each of the justified or primed cells in which 3 cents was offered is compared
against WAGECUT, the unexplained wage cut. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance indicators: p ≤ 0.10 : ∗,
.p ≤ 0.05 :∗∗ and p ≤ .01 :∗∗∗.
Despite no overall effect of a wage cut, we know that the different justifications strongly affected
willingness to accept the wage cut. To test whether these justifications affected consummate perfor-
mance, Column (3) reports a regression where ANYWAGECUT is decomposed into each of the distinct
justifications, with WAGECUT as the comparison group. In this regression, we see that the coefficient on
PROFITWC is negative and large, with a nearly 20 percentage point reduction in agreement to complete
the survey. The effect is conventionally significant. However, given the multitude of treatment cells, the
finding of one significant effect out of five could very likely be due to chance. On the other hand, finding
the strongest negative effects in the cell with themost unreasonable justification could indicate an actual
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behavioral response. And yet there is additional evidence for the argument that the seeming effect of the
profits treatment is spurious: in Columns (4) and (5), we change the outcomes to the advice and trust
z-scores and find no substantial differences across cells. For both outcomes, we would fail to reject the
null hypothesis of zero coefficients on all group indicators (p = 0.16 for the advice measure and p = 0.74
for the trust measure). However, for both the trust and advicemeasures, we are under-powered to detect
anything but very large effects, with the standard errors beingmore than 3/10ths of a standard deviation
in the outcome variable.
B Experimental materials










Figure 4: Initial instructions page
Notes: This was the first page that all participants—regardless of experimental group—first landed on.
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Figure 5: Transcription environment for all paragraphs
Notes: All subjects transcribing paragraphs used this interface for both the initial three paragraphs and the
additional paragraph. Note that the task value differed depending upon the treatment assignment.
Figure 6: Fairness priming question in FAIRNESSPRIMEDWC
Notes: Subjects in FAIRNESSPRIMEDWC were asked what was a fair wage for a paragraph, using this dialog.
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Figure 7: “Trust game” dialog
Notes: This screenshot shows the instructions and choices for subjects playing the contextualized “trust
game.”
Figure 8: Follow-on survey dialog
Notes: This screenshot shows the interface in which we presented subjects with the opportunity to take a
follow-on survey at a later date.
Figure 9: “Patience” dialog
Notes: This screenshot shows the interface in which we presented subjects with the opportunity to delay
getting paid in exchange for a larger payment at a later date.
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Figure 10: “Advice” dialog
Notes: This screenshot shows the interface in which we asked subjects to provide advice to other workers.
Figure 11: Demographics dialog
Notes: This screenshot shows the interface in which we asked subjects to provide some demographic infor-
mation. It also shows the completion code link that subjects used to generate a code which could link their
responses to their MTurk identities.
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Figure 12: MTurk tasks that Amazon supports via pre-made templates and vetted workers
Notes: This is a screenshot of the Amazon Mechanical Turk interface for starting a new project from a tem-
plate. The column of text on the left side of the image shows the common use cases for MTurk. The “Tran-
scription from an Image” task is selected and shown, which is the kind of task we used for our experiment.
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